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Towards a Secure Service Provisioning Framework in a Smart City 
Environment
Abstract: 
Over the past few years the concept of Smart cities has emerged to transform urban areas into 
connected and well informed spaces. Services that make smart cities “Smart” are curated by 
using data streams of smart cities i.e., inhabitants’ location information, digital engagement, 
transportation, environment and local government data. Accumulating and processing of these 
data streams raise security and privacy concerns at individual and community levels. Sizeable 
attempts have made to ensure security and privacy of inhabitants’ data. However, security and 
privacy issues of smart cities are not confined to inhabitants only; service provider and local 
government have their own reservations – service provider trust, reliability of the sensed data, 
and data ownership, to name a few. In this research work we identified a comprehensive list of 
stakeholders and modelled their involvement in smart cities by using Onion Model approach. 
Based on the model we presented a security and privacy framework for secure and privacy-
aware service provisioning in smart cities, namely ‘Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ 
(SSServProv) Framework. Unlike previous attempts, our framework provides end-to-end 
security and privacy features for trustable data acquisition, transmission, processing and 
legitimate service provisioning. The proposed framework ensures inhabitants’ privacy, and also 
guarantees integrity of services. It also ensures that public data is never misused by malicious 
service providers. To demonstrate efficacy of SSServProv we developed and tested core 
functionalities of authentication, authorisation and lightweight secure communication protocol for 
data acquisition and service provisioning. For various smart cities service provisioning scenarios 
we verified these protocols by an automated security verification tool called Scyther.  
Keywords: Smart city, security, privacy, trust, framework, stakeholders, secure service 
provisioning 
1. Introduction and Context
Smart cities are emerging rapidly due to new technologies e.g. Internet of Things (IoTs) such as 
RFIDs, environmental sensors, actuators, smart phones, wearable sensors, cloud computing 
etc. New smart city services and applications (e.g. participatory sensing [1][2]) provide the 
opportunity to collect and effectively use large scale city data for information awareness, urban 
planning, policy making and decision making [3][4]. As a result, new models of transformed 
urban governance e.g. open governance are being formed where data from different devices 
(e.g things) can be integrated with existing city data (i.e. from various departments and local 
agencies). This integrated data can analysed for application specific information and knowledge 
generation [2]. Such processing and storage of large scale data can be performed in a cloud 
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environment to satisfy quality of service requirements e.g. response time of end user queries by 
provisioning of cloud based virtually unlimited elastic computational and storage facilities.  
 
However, with these opportunities and transformational (or open) models of urban governance 
there exist new threats to user and/or device privacy and confidentiality of data when 
communicated between two or more devices and/or users, and establishing trust on services 
and information [5]. Christin, D. et al performed a state of the art literature survey on privacy 
issues in mobile based participatory sensing applications and identified open privacy issues with 
possible solutions [1]. Similarly, De Cristofaro, E., Soriente, C., argued that privacy of both data 
consumers and data producers must be afforded for user participation in participatory 
applications [6]. In addition, inherent cloud security issues e.g. storage at remote data centres, 
physical access etc contribute further in dealing with smart cities data security issues [7]. 
Managing such data and developing new services from a smart city perspective requires proper 
security and privacy measures which can help in establishing trust and adopting smart services 
by various stakeholders including citizens.  
 
State of the art literature review indicates that smart city solutions need a comprehensive 
approach in dealing with smart city data security, user or device privacy and trust issues. For 
instance, Symantec published a comprehensive report on security and privacy challenges in 
smart cities – identifying smart cities as a domain of hyper vulnerability [8]. According to 
Symantec Internet Security threat report 22% of targeted attacks are aimed at governments and 
energy/utilities companies; whereas, government and healthcare institutions are the target of 
24% of identity breaches. The report stated that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
systems based on conventional software technologies are subjects of attacks, and 
vulnerabilities can be exploited to disrupt the service delivery. This can have devastating effects 
on security and privacy of the inhabitants as their private and confidential service usage data 
will be at risk. This report has identified that not only security and privacy of the users are at risk, 
service providers are also facing cyber security threats. This is because attackers can 
compromise service delivery model to gain illicit access to the service itself or would attack data 
sensed / accumulated by a service. Numerous attack scenarios are identified in which an 
attacker can either inject malicious information in the system causing faulty provisioning of a 
service or can impersonate legitimate service subscribers to gain illicit access to the service and 
private and confidential data. The authors conclude the report with the recommendation for a 
secure transition to a resilient smart city - establishing governance framework, compliance to 
risk and governance policies, protecting information proactively, authenticating users, managing 
security services and developing information management strategy. The report also refers to 
World Economic Forum Cyber Resilience Maturity Model – classifying organizations based on 
their security awareness and willingness to take on proactive measures [9]. These 
classifications are based on the level of concerns ranging from least to high as: unaware, 
fragmented, top down, pervasive and networked. This maturity model is very useful in making 
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government rules and regulations for service provisioning in smart cities.  
 
Similarly, Bohli, J-M.,  et al highlight security, privacy and trust challenges of using ICT in smart 
cities context [10]. These challenges are mainly attributed to distributed nature of IoTs which 
require new innovative security mechanisms. For instance, they argue that many devices are no 
longer protected by well-known mechanisms such as firewalls and can be attacked by wireless 
channels directly. In addition, due to pervasiveness of IoT, devices can be stolen and analysed 
by attackers to reveal internal sensitive mechanisms which can be vulnerable to attacks. They 
emphasise that establishing trust between multiple data sources to perform data processing and 
generate required information is another important challenge which also require secure 
exchange of data between devices and/or their consumers.  
 
Likewise, Correia L M et al identify several characteristics of smart cities and requirements for 
technologies which pose new challenges to data security and privacy needs [11]. For instance, 
in a context aware service provisioning, user characterisation and identity needs to be protected 
for privacy reasons e.g. techniques like pseudonymisation can be used to avoid illicit use of 
personal information. Similarly, interconnection of various city systems e.g. traffic, energy, utility 
may introduce unknown vulnerabilities in the systems and require security research in complex 
distributed systems including advanced encryption, authentication and access control, advance 
data aggregation techniques and interoperable identity management etc.  
 
It is evident from literature that many attempts have been made to identify security and privacy 
concerns of future cities as indicated in Section 6. However, existing work in the area of smart 
cities is limited to security of data or curated services. Also, with emergence of new or 
transformed urban governance models such as open governance and open data based citizen 
services create new privacy and security challenges. 
 
In the above context, our main contributions in this research include: i) identification of a 
comprehensive list of stakeholders ranging from inhabitants to local governments and data 
streams to service providers presented as Stakeholder Onion Model; ii) identification of 
stakeholders as entities who are affected by malicious behaviour of other involved entities; iii) 
presentation of security and privacy concerns from all angle i.e., stakeholder being a victim and 
attacker as well; iv) end to end secure and privacy aware service provisioning in smart cities; v) 
introduction of a new security framework namely ‘Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ 
(SSServProv) Framework, that covers security, confidentiality and privacy aspects from the 
perspectives of service providers and service consumers; vi) definition of an example use case 
of open governance using citizen participation and open data that is used for instantiation of the 
SSServProv framework; and, vii) verification model for testing selected components of the 
security framework as proof of concept against well-known security threats and results are 
presented through automated verification tool namely Scyther.   
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1.1 Rationale 
Approximately 50% of world’s population live in urban areas, a number which is expected to 
increase to nearly 60% by 2030 [12]. High levels of urbanisation are even more evident in 
Europe where today over 75% of Europeans live in urban areas and the urbanisation of 
European population is expected to increase over 80% by 2020 [13]. Urbanisation and its 
associated socio-economic and environmental impacts is one of the key drivers of change that 
challenges the sustainability of urban environments globally and placing significant pressure on 
public authorities to respond in mitigating and adapting these challenges.  
 
Over the past few years the concept of Smart cities has emerged to transform urban areas into 
connected and well informed spaces. Cities around the world (Vienna, San Francisco, Bristol, 
etc.) are trying to adopt this new notion of connectivity for better urban planning, disaster 
recovery and improved quality of life. Driven by the advancements of information and 
communication technologies the cities of future will be better planned and well informed from 
micro (inhabitants, local businesses) to macro level (local government). ICT is becoming 
increasingly pervasive to urban environments and providing the necessary basis for citizen 
participation in planning decisions. New socio-economic, environmental, health, land use and 
citizens data collection through crowdsourcing and other IoTs can be used for analysis and 
decision making for sustainability and resilience of the smart future cities.  
  
However, all these advancements come at the cost of “right to security and privacy”. The whole 
concept of Smart cities is tightly coupled with “data” and “connectivity”. Services that make 
smart cities “Smart” are curated by using data stream of Smart cities i.e., inhabitants’ location 
and digital engagement information, transportation and local government data. Accumulating 
and processing of these data stream raises security and privacy concerns at individual and 
community level as well.  These security and privacy concerns are not confined to inhabitants 
only, service provider and local government has their own valid reservations. Therefore, ICT 
solutions seek suitable platform and data security mechanisms to maintain user privacy, comply 
with national legislations of data sharing, establish trust on these solutions and maintain integrity 
& confidentiality of data and secure service provision. Such security measures are needed for 
wider adoption of smart cities solutions by public administrations as well as citizens.  
  
1.2 Research methodology 
The objective of this work is to identify smart city data and services security challenges and 
propose appropriate end to end security solutions. In this research a mixed method approach is 
adopted that is based on literature survey and scenario based model verification. Using this 
methodology we first identify various smart cities data security related challenges and limitations 
in existing solutions. Then, we introduce Smart Secure Service Provisioning (SSServProv) 
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framework that deals with data curation and secure and privacy-aware service provisioning in 
Smart cities. Since, the impact of services in Smart cities is at macro level, it is very important 
that accurate and traceable data is curated and processed by the service provider. To cater this 
SSServProv deals with citizen authentication and data anonymization. As proof of concept we 
verify effectiveness of selected components of the security architecture through a scenario 
based model verification technique.       
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as: Section 2 identifies different stakeholders who can 
benefit from the proposed solutions. Section 3 briefly introduces smart cities and associated 
data security challenges. Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ (SSServProv) Framework is 
presented in Section 4. Proof of concept through Scyther based automated model verification is 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the related work along with comparative analysis of 
SSServProv with state-of-art in Smart cities. Section 7 concludes the paper along with future 
work.  
 
 
2. Stakeholder Onion model 
Data security and privacy aspects need to be dealt from different stakeholders’ point of view to 
support end-to-end application security. For smart city information security, mainly seven major 
stakeholder roles are identified. These roles are derived from listing all possible types of 
stakeholders who may have direct or indirect vested interest in smart city development. Since 
such a list is exhaustive, stakeholder roles are defined which are relatively manageable and 
easy to present. These roles can be used to defined role-based access policies using 
appropriate tools e.g. XACML [29]. These roles are: 
Service consumers: represent stakeholders who are end users and mostly direct beneficiary of 
a system, for example, Citizens, Community, Public administration, City planners, Policy 
makers, NGOs, Service Developers, Domain Experts, Business Organisations, Local Agencies 
(Environment/Transport), etc. 
Legitimate service providers: represent stakeholders who are registered with a governing 
body and are authorised to deliver services to service consumers.  These services can be 
Information services, Utility services, Environmental services, Transport services, E-
Government services, Business services or Health services.  
Untrusted service providers: represent stakeholders who are not registered with a governing 
body but still deliver services to service consumers (e.g. marketing/advertising agencies etc.). 
There is no guarantee that there is no malicious intent behind service provision and these 
services may be provided by Hackers or Attacker, Identify thieves, Information thieves, etc.  
IT experts: represent stakeholders who introduce new systems (e.g. sensors) and develop 
software applications for different stakeholders.  These can be thematic application developers, 
Hackathon programmers, Open data app developers etc. 
Data custodians: represent stakeholders who are responsible for city city data management. 
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These can be City administrations, Environmental agencies, Transport agencies, Public security 
agencies, Social network site, Crowdsourcing users etc.  
Standard governing bodies: represent to organisations who develop different standards for 
smart city and cloud applications. Also, institutions which define related regional or national data 
laws and regulations can be included in this group. 
Domain experts: represent members who have domain specific expertise and are interested in 
development and innovation in specific thematic area, for example, Environmentalists, City 
planners, Energy experts, Transport/Mobility experts, Socio-economic experts, Policy makers, 
Health experts, IT experts, etc. 
 
These stakeholder roles are further extended and mapped on to a Product Onion Model [14] 
where each circle in Figure 1 presents specific roles relevant to the development of certain 
stage of the overall system. There are four concentric circles: 
 
The Product is the inner circle that provides Smart Security framework and components 
proposed in this paper. This provides the basis for handling data security and privacy aspects in 
variety of smart city applications from different stakeholders’ point of view.  
The System is Smart Security components and its human operators, security policies and rules 
governing its operations. The objective here is to define access, authorisation, secure 
communication protocols, and confidentiality strategies for prime operators of the product. 
These prime operators can further delegate credentials to other stakeholders in smart city 
applications layer for the development and usage of variety of applications.   
Smart City Applications encompasses the System and its operators including any human 
beneficiaries of the System. The objective here is that all operators at this layer must comply to 
security policies set up in the product layer and perform operations authorised by the system 
layer.   
The External Environment includes secure smart city applications and any other beneficiaries.  
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Figure 1: Onion model for smart cities stakeholders 
 
3. Smart cities and Data security challenges 
Smart cities are regarded as “massively connected spaces”. These spaces are intrinsically 
associated with data, connectivity, and information processing. In smart cities, sensory devices 
(smart phones, surveillance camera, IoT device), user generated contents (opinion polls, social 
media), and institutional records (government agencies, healthcare provider, transport data) are 
regarded as main sources of data. From technological perspective, the whole concept of smart 
cities evolves with the technological advancement in transmitting and sharing data 
methodologies from diverse modalities with the consideration of real-time, reliable and robust 
communication between data sources and data consumption points. The benefits of having 
massively connected spaces are realised by provisioning intelligent services (e.g. London 
Airtext1 service, Moovit2, SeeClickFix3, Street Bump4, ICT-enabled city governance and policy 
                                               
1 London Airtext service: http://www.airtext.info/  
2 Moovit app: http://moovitapp.com/en-gb/  
3 SeeClickFix: http://en.seeclickfix.com/  
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making project e.g. urbanAPI5, FUPOL6, DECUMANUS7, are few examples) to the inhabitants 
of smart cities. These services process data from diverse modalities to make intelligent 
decisions and consequently improving the quality of life within the context of environment, open 
and transparent local government processes, and behavioural change of inhabitants for 
sustainable cities to name few. 
Considering the data, connectivity and information processing as enabling factors for smart 
cities; we have identities the following entities which are vulnerable to security and privacy 
attacks. In the following we also consider that these entities can act maliciously, consequently 
compromising security and privacy of other active and passive entities. Fig 2, presents the 
security and privacy concerns of smart cities. 
 
Figure 2: Smart city: Security and privacy consideration of participating entities.  
                                                                                                                                                       
4 StreetBump: http://streetbump.org/  
5 urbanAPI: http://urbanapi.eu/  
6 FUPOL: http://www.fupol.eu/en  
7 DECUMANUS: http://decumanus-fp7.eu/home/  
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3.1. User 
In the context of smart cities a User is regarded as an entity which contributes in data 
generation by transmitting and sharing data from sensory devices and daily life interactions / 
activities. In return user expects services transforming personal and urban life experience by 
getting contextual information of their surroundings.  
 
i) Personal information  
One of the biggest security and privacy concerns in smart cities is risk of compromising user’s 
personal information. Connected environment expects user to transmit and share sensed and 
user generated data. Data from different modalities along with publically available information 
are processed to provide desired services. For example in a connected environment user is 
interacting with a service which processes location information to recommend nearby dining 
places based on user preferences. However there is great risk of security and privacy 
infringement, as over a period of time a malicious service provider can accumulate user’s 
dietary habits and extrapolate his/her health profile. This clearly compromises privacy having 
devastating effects on user’s personal life, as extrapolated information can be shared with 
potential employers and insurance agencies which may have reservations with certain health 
conditions user may be facing in near future, or there could be a case that the extrapolated 
information is completely wrong.  
 
ii) Data ownership and control 
Another security and privacy concern which is associated with the data generated in connected 
environments is data ownership and having accessibility control over it. Considering who has 
the right to transmit, share and process the data can have serious security and privacy 
implications. Besides this, it also affects adoption rate for a service especially for those dealing 
with private and personal data i.e., healthcare, daily activity information to name a few. 
 
The complexity of managing control over data in smart cities environment is huge, since these 
are connected spaces having myriad sensory devices collecting private and personal 
information related to user and its associated interactions – daily life activities, social media 
interaction, and sensory information. Besides this, the scope of security and privacy concerns of 
smart cities is huge; it must be considered that not all inhabitants of a connected space are 
equally concerned about security and privacy, and may be inadequately equipped with the 
knowledge to control their private and personal data i.e., adolescent and elderly. Consider an 
example in which a user having more concerns about privacy moves to a connected place 
which is controlled by a person having less concerns about his/her privacy, how the system will 
behave if there are conflicting data sensing, transmitting and sharing policies. If there is a case 
of conflicting policies how the user is informed in advance about the security and privacy 
implications. 
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In the subsequent sections we will elaborate that even if access control policies are managed 
and enforced properly there are possibilities that malicious service providers can still infer 
personal information which leads to a loss of data and personal privacy. 
 
iii) Identity 
Data from diverse sources i.e., location information, user interaction, open and linked data and 
social media are few examples of data sources, is processed in the realm of smart cities. The 
efficacy of smart cities and the success of services it can offer are directly based on data, which 
can either be obtained from a public and private domain with the consents of involved entities – 
users, organizations, government agencies etc. 
   
However, most of the security and privacy issues are directly concerned with the association 
between the data and its owner. For example if a location based social networking service 
which processes user’s location information is compromised and losses its data, the attacker 
can effortlessly learn activity patterns and contextual preferences of the users subscribed to the 
social networking service. 
   
Depending on the nature of a service some may require to process personal information i.e., 
healthcare services which require user vital signs information in order to provide appropriate 
healthcare services. In such services sensed data should be properly anonymised in order to 
avoid malicious use of the sensed data which enables an attacker to effortlessly associate 
clinical findings with the user. Data acquisition and its processing should be within legal limits 
defined by concerned authorities along with the consent of entities having directly security and 
privacy implications. 
 
Services which are designed for massively connected spaces must persist and process 
personal data in such a way that in case of an attack it is practically infeasible to track back to 
the original sources of the data. On the other hand, association between the data and the 
respective entities is important in order to ensure that data is gathered and processed from 
credible sources.  
 
3.2. Data 
The ecosystem of smart cities is built around data, which is gathered from diverse sources 
having varied security and privacy requirements. In the subsequent sections we will elaborate 
security and privacy concerns of data transmission and its storage beyond the federated domain 
of its owner. 
 
i) Transmission 
Smart city is a highly connected environment which expects to obtain data from different 
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modalities – data acquisition through sensory devices (i.e., smartphones, surveillance cameras, 
traffic data etc.) and processed data (i.e., government data, social network analysis etc.). Each 
of these data acquisition methodologies has its own security and privacy concerns. For 
example, in case of sensory devices it is important to ensure that data is securely transmitted 
between the sensor nodes and central processing unit. Other security and privacy concerns 
which require a collaborative effort amongst the sensor node and central processing units are 
authenticating and authorising sensor nodes within a massively connected space. Also, in a 
space where myriad sensor nodes are working collaboratively it is important to identify malicious 
behaviour of a sensor node and isolate it from the network. Whereas, to ensure that data 
acquisition through sensor nodes comply with data security and privacy policy of a particular 
context, introduces more complexity in management and enforcement of data transmission and 
sharing policies.  
  
Similarly, for processed data which is shared between services to complement each other’s 
functionality there are great risks of security and privacy infringement. For instance, a location 
based social network can utilize its user generated contents to identify places which are popular 
amongst certain group of people. Local businesses can consume this information in order to 
define effective marketing strategy.  However, if this information is infamously used, there are 
great risks of security and privacy infringements for the participating entities. 
 
ii) Cloud based services 
With the 90% of world’s data generated in the last few years, cloud computing is becoming 
prevalent [15] – with its on-demand resource provisioning. In smart cities cloud computing can 
significantly elevate the capabilities of a service to persist, process and provision data. 
However, with services relying on public cloud infrastructure (i.e., storage, computation, 
network), there are great risks of security and privacy infringements. Public cloud providers are 
often considered as untrusted entities because very little technical and management details of 
the cloud infrastructure are shared by the providers. Internal working of a cloud infrastructure is 
regarded as business secret. 
 
Since, public cloud infrastructure resides beyond the federated domain of its subscribers, often 
cryptographic methodologies are employed to ensure data privacy and confidentiality. However, 
these methodologies can significantly limits the data processing capabilities. For example 
encrypted data cannot be searched by using conventional content matching algorithms, also 
processing encrypted data for analytical purposes becomes computationally infeasible as 
encryption distorts data in order to achieve confidentiality.  
 
Another problem of public cloud infrastructure is trust, how to ensure that public cloud provider 
is performing the defined task honestly and not colluding with malicious entities to compromise 
security and privacy of the data. There could be a case in which access control policy is defined 
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by a subscriber to provision access to processed data to other services e.g., a restaurant 
recommendation service can request information from an data analysis service which providers 
list of dining places based on social network analysis. In this case how to ensure that public 
cloud provider is enforcing access control policies honestly and not provisioning access to 
unauthorised subscribers. 
 
Even if all privacy and security measures are enforced properly, public cloud providers can still 
compromise privacy of the data and consequently its subscribers by analysing service usage 
patterns. Consider an example in which an inhabitant of a connected environment shares its 
vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, glucose readings, dietary habits etc.) with a medical doctor. If 
cloud infrastructure is employed to securely store and process the sensed data, public cloud 
provider can still infer health conditions of the inhabitant, by simply analysing data access 
patterns i.e., if data is more frequently accessed by a doctor specializes in chronic diseases it is 
likely that the inhabitant is suffering from health condition having long-lasting clinical effects. 
 
3.3. Service provider 
In smart cities the core purpose of data acquisition from diverse modalities is to provide services 
to its inhabitants. Security and privacy concerns of massively connected space are not confined 
to its inhabitants (or service consumers) only. Service providers have their own concerns, which 
mainly arise because inhabitants can behave maliciously by either tampering the hardware and 
software resources which sense and process the data respectively (e.g. crowd sourcing 
applications). Also, protecting privacy of both data consumers and producers is an essential 
element to promote participatory applications in smart cities.  
 
For example, a power company relying on smart metering infrastructure may be concerned by 
the integrity of the smart meters which measures power usage of its subscribers. This is 
because malicious subscribers can tamper smart meters to provider false reading of power 
consumption. Since, smart metering infrastructure rely on wireless communications to relay 
sensed data, security concerns associated with the data transmission need to be addressed as 
well, from both service provider and inhabitants prospect. Service providers are concerned 
about the integrity of the sensed data. Whereas inhabitants require end-to-end confidentiality 
ensuring that transmitted data cannot be intercepted by an attacker to learn the power usage 
pattern.  
 
Service providers relying public cloud infrastructure to process the sensed data and provision 
services to its subscribers, may have concerns about honesty of the cloud provider. For 
example a data analysis service which processes publically available data to sell its finding to 
local businesses for effecting marketing, may be concerned that its analysis results can be 
intercepted by a malicious cloud provider and sold to its potential customers.  
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3.4. Information 
With the initiations like open and linked data the concepts of smart cities will flourish. We will 
see new and innovative services exploiting massively connected spaces – consequently 
elevating the quality of life in smart cities. Smart cities are source of huge volume of data, but 
there are some serious security and privacy concerns which are associated with it. These 
concerns range from an individual inhabitant of a smart city to a community level. This is 
because data generated from the smart cities can reveal unforeseen information, which may not 
be evident otherwise, and can have associated privacy implications. 
 
3.5. Citizen (or Information) Services 
 
The concept of smart cities is tightly coupled with the data and services. These services utilize 
data from diverse modalities to provide useful statistical measures (e.g., geo-tags, pollution, tree 
count etc.). The efficacy of smart cities lies in the hand of application developers to make 
innovative use of data by providing better urban life experience to its inhabitants and useful 
statistical measures to policy makers. 
 
However, in a technological ecosystem where myriad developers can utilize seamlessly 
available data (sensory, social engagement and government data), another security issue that 
needs to be addressed is how to ensure that services are solely developed to elevate urban life 
experience and are not having malicious intents to compromise privacy of a subscriber. For 
example, one of the sustainable and smart transport solutions to reduce GHG emissions is car 
or lift-sharing using a specific business model (e.g. Car2Go8) where sharing of passenger and 
financial information may be exploited by different service providers.  
 
In addition, as the concept of smart cities matures, numerous services will be developed, driven 
by a need to target new business opportunities. For example, in a shopping mall equipped 
indoor positioning system (e.g., Apple iBeacon), a shopping service pushes location specific 
advertisements based on user’s location and preferences. If the service having malicious intents 
it can collude with sellers offering higher prices, and advertise their products, consequently 
betraying subscribers relying on credibility of the advertisements. Similarly of-the-shelf sensor 
devices (e.g., surveillance camera, motion sensors) can be developed by a service provider 
having malicious intents to compromise privacy of a user or targeted community.  
 
A crucial challenge faced by smart cities is developing a trust framework which can ensure that 
services driving smart cities are not having malicious intent. This problem is similar to App 
markets for smartphone industry which are maintained by vendors. In App markets every 
service is meticulously tested to ensure it complies with policies and regulations.  Security and 
                                               
8 Car2Go: https://www.car2go.com/en/austin/  
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privacy challenges of  “Service Market” for smart cities have many critical implications. Since, 
smart cities is an emerging concept having blurry data usage and service provisioning 
regulations, and most critically having myriad data sources to exploit, there is a great need to 
realise a trust framework which can test and ensure service is credible and fit for use for its  
inhabitants.  
 
4. The Smart Secure Service Provisioning (SSServProv) Framework for Smart Cities 
In the previous sections we highlighted the fact the security and privacy concerns in smart cities 
are not confined to inhabitants only. Service providers and government agencies have their own 
concerns ranging from tamper resilient service to enforcement of governmental regulations and 
policies. Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual model of the ‘Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ 
(SSServProv) Framework for massively connected spaces. It deals with secure and privacy-
aware provisioning of services and trusted acquisition of data in smart cities. Besides this, it also 
ensures that involved entities are working in compliance with governmental regulations and 
policies. 
 
 
Figure 3: Concept model of Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ (SSServProv) Framework. 
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Before we present the SSServProv framework in detail (Figure 4), we first describe a use case 
for smart cities open data management, followed by descriptive details of SSServProv 
framework. 
 
Use Case: Open governance through open data and citizen participation 
Like many city administrations in Europe, City council Pesh is moving towards an open 
governance model by transforming its administrative and decision making processes. One of 
the steps taken by the Pesh council is to make a large amount of city data open and accessible 
through its open data web interface which can be exploited by its citizens and other businesses. 
Due to cuts in IT budget, the Pesh council wants to reduce development and maintenance 
budget and hence decides to deploy its open data system on a cloud platform using pay as you 
use model. This cloud platform is owned by Zebr. 
Pesh council intends to update and enrich this open data on daily basis. Therefore it outsources 
a web based application to local SME Tanvin to maintain regular updates of city data. The 
agreement between Pesh and Tanvin enables Tanvin to get access to some additional city data 
which is not publicly available and does not violate any data sharing policies (e.g. health data). 
In return, Tanvin develops open data management system, namely ‘Smartizen’, for Pesh council 
that allows citizens and other local stakeholders to identify new issues by enriching existing data 
or providing new data through a smartphone app or PC web browser. Citizens and local 
stakeholders use Smartizen to get access to open data (through visual application) and 
participate in city processes by providing new updates on local aspects. Smartizen also offers 
open interfaces for other service developers to access open data and develop new applications 
which can also be used to enrich open data through crowdsourcing. The Pesh council uses the 
updated data for their planning purposes. Tanvin, as a legitimate service developer registered 
with Pesh council, can use available city data and develops new applications for its business. 
However, Pesh council is also concerned about data security aspects. Pesh council wants to 
ensure that all data integrity, privacy and trust related issues are properly managed. For 
example, the identity of citizens and other local participants using Smartizen should be hidden 
from Zebr and Tanvin to: i) comply with the National citizen identity/location publication policy, 
and ii) avoid any illegitimate exploitation of end user behavioural patterns. Also, only authorised 
council staff should be able to access the new enriched data. Pesh council also wants to ensure 
that data enrichments and updates from citizens and other stakeholders are reliable and do not 
possess malicious intent e.g. wasting council resources on a false alarm. Smartizen should also 
respect privacy concerns of crowd source participants based on their privacy preferences e.g. 
anonymised feedback. 
 
It is worth mentioning that aforementioned use case is a general service provisioning and data 
accumulation scenario for any smart city e.g. pilots in Smarticipate project [27] and IES Cities 
project [28]. This scenario can be specialised for a particular service e.g. protecting privacy of 
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participants in a crowd-sourcing application; or authorised access to data or personalized 
service; or secure storage of city data in cloud; or secure exchange of data between two or 
more entities/users, etc. The generic nature of the above scenario indicates various security and 
privacy requirements for different services and hence it necessitates a structured and flexible 
design of the proposed framework. In this respect, the proposed SSServProv framework can be 
scaled to these specialised services, mainly because of its layer approached of service 
provisioning, adopting standard security solutions, governmental control and service 
consumption in smart cities. This layered approach covers known security issues as reported in 
the literature and by deploying various components in three layers, as depicted in Figure 4. This 
layered approach is akin to service oriented approach that can be scaled to handle end-to-end 
secure and privacy-aware provisioning of new services. The strength of this approach is its 
flexibility to accommodate new components in these three layers to handle zero-day security 
threats or scenarios. For example, the concept of governmental control domain to 
implement/enforce policies and regulations under which service providers and consumers can 
operate can be extended with new policies to handle evolving security parameters or scenarios. 
In addition to that the token based authentication, secure communication protocol, and 
authorisation mechanisms are included in the form of separate components therefore these all 
components can be easily scaled to meet the future requirements of city administration, service 
providers and service consumers.  
   
 
Figure 4: Smart Secure Service Provisioning (SSServProv) Framework for Smart cities 
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4.1. Governmental control domain: 
In the proposed framework governmental control domain works as a regulatory authority. Its 
main goal is to ensure that both service provider and inhabitants of smart cities are working 
within the defined regulations and policies. 
i) Service provider verification 
To ensure legitimate and trustable service provisioning it is very important to verify a service 
provider (i.e., organization or individual). This will not only restrain malicious service providers 
from deluding the inhabitants but also assist in traceability in case of any security breach and 
privacy infringement.   
In the aforementioned scenario Tanvin would first need to register itself with the Pesh council. 
By registering, it provides service descriptor to the council – stating its service contract, 
intentions and justification for data acquisition. Pesh council can then decide to authorise Tanvin 
to provision its service to inhabitants of Pesh or not. It can also order any change in service 
provisioning according to security and privacy implications. 
 
ii) Seamless sensed data analysis 
It is very important that regulatory authority implements a proper audit trail mechanism. This 
ensures that involved entities are working within their limits. This component monitors service 
provisioning and data acquisition channels to identify any unauthorised provisioned services 
and malicious data access. 
Pesh council works in conjunction with Internet Service Providers to seamlessly monitoring 
network traffic. To ensure uninterrupted service provisioning network analysis can be carried out 
in offline mode and periodically. Since, the council knows Tanvin service descriptor it can 
identify if Tanvin tries to maliciously sense data which is not defined in its service descriptor. It 
can then revoke Tanvin’s service verification and informed the inhabitant accordingly. 
 
iii) Linked open data 
The regulatory authority takes on the responsibilities to provide open data access to authorised 
service providers. It leverages service provider to design, develop and provision services 
elevating life experiences within smart cities. 
Tanvin can avail open government linked data access to find new business opportunities for 
service provisioning within healthcare, transport. Since, each service provider is registered with 
Pesh council it is very convenient to manage fine-grained access. 
 
iv) Citizen identity 
Issuing credential to inhabitants of smart cities is very important, since inhabitant derives the 
data generated by massively connected spaces within smart cities. Citizen identities ensure that 
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service providers can trust the data sources, and in case of any data delude can trace back the 
source and avoid forge service experience. 
Pesh council issues verifiable identity attributes to its inhabitants. Any pseudonym technique 
can be used here. For example, Tanvin designs a recommendation service which assists single 
mothers in raising their newborn. Since, Pesh council is providing funding to support the 
recommendation system Tanvin needs to ensure that only legitimate single mothers are using it 
- Tanvin does not want to misuse the tax payers’ money. Each subscriber provides it identity 
attributes issued by Pesh council, and Travin effortlessly verifies inhabitant’s request and 
provisions service accordingly. 
  
4.2. Smart cities Inhabitants / infrastructure 
This layer of our proposed framework deals with security and privacy of inhabitants and data 
generated from diverse modalities (i.e., sensed data, user generated data). It also ensures that 
provisioned services are working properly and are not tampered by malicious entities.  
Enforcement of governmental regulations and policies is handled by this layer as well. 
  
i) Authentication 
Security and privacy measures can only achieve their goals if involved entities are authenticated 
and possess legitimate credentials to access and provision services, inhabitants and service 
providers respectively. This component deals with registration of inhabitants which consume 
services. It ensures that service provider is acquiring data and provisioning services to 
legitimate users only. It is also responsible for authenticating provisioned services to guarantee 
that inhabitants are not engaging with malicious or forged services. After verification, registration 
authority issues a certificate or access tokens to the verified inhabitants for consuming services 
as an authenticated user. 
 
In the context of aforementioned scenario, Pesh council maintains attribute based credentials of 
inhabitants. Credentials managers are responsible for checking legitimacy of credentials, this 
ensures that inhabitants are consuming service with their real / legitimate credentials, and are 
not using pseudonyms. Credentials manager also takes on the responsibility of checking 
legitimacy of services provided by Tanvin. This restrains provisioning of malicious services as 
each service would have to undergo issued credential verification before it can be consumed by 
inhabitants.   
  
ii) Services & Applications  
This component deals with tamper resistant service provisioning and enforcement of 
governmental regulations. Service provider can be a victim of unauthorised service consumption 
as malicious users can tamper services to gain illicit access.  Since, service provider is required 
to abide by rules and regulations laid by government this model also takes on the responsibility 
of ensuring that services are working as delineated by their service descriptor approved by a 
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regulatory authority during service registration process. After verification, it must be digitally 
signed so an attacker cannot tamper it. Furthermore, the software modules used in various 
services are also digitally signed by using the credentials stored in the trusted module. With 
services and applications, Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) utilises XACML based access 
control model in which it uses Roles,, Rules, , Objects , and Permissions. Attributes based 
model can be used to ensure that application and services are only provisioned to authorised 
users. PEP will assist Tanvin to enforce required policies. 
 
Considering the working scenario, Tanvin can deploy tamper resistant sensors and network 
nodes equipped with trusted modules. It can then run periodic checks on sensors through 
trusted modules. This can be achieved by requesting each sensor to engage in a challenge 
which can only be verifiable by the trusted module if service or sensor is not tampered. This 
challenge is a digital signature of all software modules used in the business logic. Trusted 
module can also monitor network traffic to ensure that unauthorised users are not consuming 
services by circumventing any security measure i.e., credentials or required identity attributes. 
PEP assists Tanvin to implement required security and privacy policies accordingly to its service 
descriptor; for example in a healthcare service user name and identify information is 
anonymised and the policy defined in eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
also uses these anonymised IDs which are mapped with the roles. 
   
  
iii) Policy Decision Point (Policies for context and location) 
Risks of security breach and privacy infringement can be significantly reduced if appropriate 
access control and data confidentiality policies are selected. This component of our proposed 
framework deals with selection of policies which ensures that necessary measures are taken 
before user’s private and confidential information be accessed or shared.  Policies are selected 
based on sensed information and service descriptor. If a service requires access to private and 
confidential data, it may be required that to store data in an untrusted domain either data must 
be anonymised or encrypted before it can leave user controlled domain. Stakeholder Onion 
model presented in the Section 2, explicitly identifies entities (or roles) which may request to 
access a particular resource or provision a service within a smart city. PEP can utilise this 
information to provision access based on their pre-defined interaction with the resources (e.g., 
data, network, services etc).  These access control policies can be defined using a role-based 
profiles in XACML [29]. 
 
For example consider Tanvin provisions location-aware recommendation system for tourist 
attraction and hotels. However, with evolving government regulations Pesh council can declare 
certain areas having serious privacy implication i.e., bars, casino, blue light areas to name a 
few. In this context policy controller assists Tanvin to select appropriate security and privacy 
policies which comply with government regulations. Policy controller works collaboratively with 
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Policy Retrial Point to select most suitable policies. Local policies ensure that within Pesh 
council local communities or stakeholders can define their own data acquisition policies – a bar 
can decide that wearable cameras (e.g. Google glasses) have serious implications on it 
business thus prohibits its usage within its premises. 
  
iv) Authorisation 
This component complements the capabilities of Services and Applications to enforce 
appropriate access control policies. It also maintains an access control logs to record data 
access activity. Furthermore, these log files are encrypted and digitally signed so any malicious 
software cannot read it and even cannot change it for malicious purposes. These log files 
significantly help in case of privacy infringement. It is used to store general access control 
policies which comply with regulatory authority or personalized access control preferences 
defined by inhabitants. The proposed framework is designed to handle various access models. 
Access control manager can realise an appropriate access control model e.g. role-based 
XACML model [29], complying to authorisation requirements specified in the service description 
and entities interacting with the services and resources.  
  
For example Pesh council permits authorised service providers to provision activity monitoring 
services to its inhabitants – assisting them to live a healthy life by learning their calories count 
and exercise routines. Tanvin does so by analysis data from wearable devices (e.g., smart 
watch etc.) and location information to learn inhabitant’s meal preferences. However, a user 
may be conscious about her location and may wish not to share. Authorisation component 
leverages her to define personalized data access policies restraining Tanvin from access 
location information from some or all location, depending on inhabitant’s choice (or contextual 
preferences). 
  
v) Data confidentiality 
This component deals with data security. It ensures that private and confidential data is not 
accessible to malicious service providers or users. It provides necessary cryptographic 
primitives enabling inhabitants and authorised service provider to process and persist data in 
untrusted domain i.e., public cloud services. It works in conjunction with Services and 
Applications to conceal sensitive data according to the security policies selected by policy 
decision point. These policies can specify either all data should be protected or only specific 
parts should be concealed. The data protection policies also provide information about the 
cryptographic algorithm used for encryption of private and confidential data. Since, most of data 
storage software provides built-in mechanism for encryption so in our solution we considered 
those. For data integrity and non-repudiation, we introduced an extra field which stores 
signature of a complete row. When a user or a service tries to access data from data storage, 
first it verifies the signature and after that decrypts encrypted attributes before presenting to the 
requested module. 
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Tanvin can sense data according to its access privileges; however, Pesh council can require all 
data outsourced to public cloud storage should be in encrypted form. Through data 
confidentiality Tanvin obtains the necessary cryptographic keys to encrypt the data and later 
perform analysis over encrypted data. 
  
vi) Data Anonymization 
For accurate and efficient data analysis it is very important the service providers process and 
access the sensed in a convenient way. However, there are caveats in doing so as private and 
personal data can end up in the hands of users or service providers having malicious intents. 
Data anonymization offers the convenience of processing sensed data at the same time it also 
ensures the inhabitants are decoupled with the sensed data. This significantly reduces the 
possibilities of privacy infringement as without correct mapping information data cannot be 
traced back to its data owner or concerned stakeholder. It also assist service provider to explore 
new business possibilities by sharing anonymised sensed data with other service providers. 
Pesh council can permit Tanvin to sense user vital sign (i.e., blood pressure, glucose level, 
respiratory rate). However, when stored in untrusted domain these vital sign should not reveal 
health condition of the associated inhabitant. Since, Tanvin process streams of sensed data it is 
computationally infeasible to encrypt the sensed data and process it in concealed form. Data 
anonymization assists Tanvin in storing and processing vital sign without compromising privacy. 
For each user it assigns a randomized pseudonym and also replaces specific values with 
ranges values, which restrain malicious entities to link private and confidential data with the 
inhabitant. Mapping between real and randomized information is stored in a secure location. 
 
4.3. Service provider 
This layer of our proposed framework is designed to deal with service provisioning and secure 
and privacy-aware data sharing in untrusted domain. It enables service providers to collaborate 
on public and citizen data to find new possibilities of service provisioning consequently elevating 
life experiences in smart cities. 
  
i) Service & Application Provisioning 
This component represents execution environment for services in smart cities. It can be 
regarded as a public cloud management portal enabling service providers to manage their 
services. Service providers can scale their services according to their network and 
computational load. 
  
ii) Data repositories 
This component enables services provider to access public data repositories and also to share 
application/services specific data with other service providers. Since, public cloud computing is 
utilized to persist, process and provision data, security and privacy measures are employed to 
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prevent illicit data access. These measures include encrypted data search and processing in 
untrusted domain, fine-grained control over shared data, guaranteed user revocation, and 
secure key management. These measures enables service providers to securely collaborate 
with each other whilst maintaining control of their data without relying on untrusted cloud service 
provider.  
  
For example in the aforementioned scenario Tanvin can access open government transport 
data to provision a bus route recommendation service. It future post-process the data, 
identifying most frequently used bus routes depending on inhabitants’ occupation and 
demographic. It can then securely share its processed data with other service providers who are 
interested in such analysis. Since, Tanvin does not want any illicit data access, it shares the 
encrypted data through public cloud storage services. Authorised service providers can then 
search, access and consume their shared data accordingly to their access privileges, where 
necessary cryptographic keys and access token are maintained by Tanvin. 
  
iii) Application programming interface 
This framework leverages service providers to open an application programming interface to 
their business logic and accumulate application/specific data, whilst maintaining fine-grained 
control over accessibility. It also maintains an access log to ensure that every access request is 
recorded. It serves two purposes, billing service providers with respect to number of access 
requests and audit trail in case of illicit or malicious access. 
  
For example, Tanvin develops a localization algorithm based on inhabitant’s mobile phone and 
Wi-fi signals. Tanvin provides an application programming interface, which triangulates 
inhabitant’s location with a precision of couple of meters. Its algorithm can be utilized by other 
service providers to develop auxiliary recommendation services e.g., restaurant, hotels, tourist 
attractions. To ensure, application programming interface is used by authorised service 
providers only, Tanvin issues verifiable cryptographic access token and maintain an access log. 
Access tokens are valid for a specific period of time, and once revoked subscribers would not 
be able to use application programming interface. 
 
 
5. Proof of Concept through Automated Verification  
As a proof of concept, an automated verification tool, namely ‘Scyther’9 is used to verify selected 
architectural components and security protocols. The verification model aims to protect private 
and confidential data of citizens. Mainly three components of the SSServProv framework are 
verified against different types of security vulnerabilities. These components are: i) 
authentication protocol, ii) secure communication protocol and iii) protection of services and 
                                               
9
 Scyther Tool: https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/  
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applications. These components (i) and (ii) are represented in the proposed architecture (Figure 
3) as ‘Authentication’ and ‘Services and Applications’ in smart city and infrastructure layer and 
(iii) represents flow of information between different layers. 
 
In order to fully understand verification models and acquired outputs, the following Figure 4 
illustrates a basic open data scenario adapted from open governance use case (Section 4). In 
Figure 5, potential security attacks and verified proposed solutions are shown when different 
actors are communicating and/or accessing resources. These potential security attacks and 
solutions are modelled in Scyther and verified revealing reliability of the above components.  
 
 
Figure 5: A generic open data based scenario  
 
For authentication, it is assumed that most of the entities or actors involved in smart city 
ecosystem authenticate each other before starting actual communication. For authentication, we 
implemented a certificate based authentication protocol [16]. For secure communication Secure 
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Socket Layer (SSL) and newly designed secure communication protocol for securely fetching 
data from different sources including connected repositories and/or sensors is used. Since 
these data sources  have different capabilities and/or properties so we designed secure 
communication protocol by considering their computing power and other resources. SSL is 
selected as it is a well-accepted standard web protocol for secure communication. In this 
section we modelled and verified authentication protocol, designed protocol for protection of 
services & applications; and verified secure communication protocol between low-end devices 
and services. 
  
5.1. Authentication Protocol 
In an ideal environment, most of the devices and clients in smart city ecosystem possess 
certificates from a certified authority e.g. components in governmental control domain layer of 
the SSServProv framework. Such devices and users use these credentials for strong 
authentication using certificate based authentication protocol, as discussed above. This 
certificate based authentication protocol can be considered an extension of FIPS-196. Various 
steps involved in strong authentication process are described in the following formal language 
that is modelled and verified by Scyther, an automated formal verification tool for security 
protocols. Figure 6 illustrates the authentication verification model and shows communication 
between two entities (users or devices) which then undergo number of injected attacks.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Authentication Protocol Verification Model  
  
// Initiator 
fresh UCa: UserCert; 
fresh UCb: UserCert; 
fresh Ra:RandomNumber; 
fresh Rb:RandomNumber; 
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fresh D:Data; 
fresh Hello:Message; 
fresh Ks:SessionKey; 
  
send_1(Ua,Ub,Hello); 
recv_2(Ub,Ua, UCb); 
send_3(Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb, {{Ra,Rb}H}sk(Ua)); 
recv_4(Ub, Ua, Ra, Rb, {{Ra,Rb}H}sk(Ub)); 
 send_5(Ua,Ub,{D, {D}H}Ks); 
  
// Responder 
fresh UCa: UserCert; 
fresh UCb: UserCert; 
fresh Ra:RandomNumber; 
fresh Rb:RandomNumber; 
fresh D:Data; 
fresh Hello:Message; 
fresh Ks:SessionKey; 
  
recv_1(Ua,Ub,Hello); 
send_2(Ub,Ua, UCb); 
recv_3(Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb, {{Ra,Rb}H}sk(Ua)); 
send_4(Ub, Ua, Ra, Rb, {{Ra,Rb}H}sk(Ub)); 
 recv_5(Ua,Ub,{D, {D}H}Ks); 
  
In literature, man-in-the-middle, replay attack, message tampering, and information leakage 
(identity) are some of the potential attacks those can be launched on authentication protocol. 
Therefore, from sender’s point of view, we specified following claims in the verification model 
(Figure 6) to analyse the behaviour of our designed authentication protocol to test authentication 
against above mentioned attacks. 
  
claim(Ua,Alive); 
claim(Ua,Weakagree); 
claim(Ua,Commit,Ub,Hello); 
claim(Ua,Commit,Ub,Hello); 
claim(Ua,Niagree); 
claim(Ua,Nisynch); 
  
The claim Weakagree is essential to check if authentication is successful. The claim with 
attribute Nisynch provides the verification that the messages are received from legitimate 
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sender in specified sequence e.g. in above illustration, Citizen registration message to 
Smartizen and Pesh Council. Since, in our protocol, we encrypted challenge using private key of 
the sender so only the corresponding public key can be used to extract the challenge. In our 
implementation, this public key is encapsulated in certificate with identity of the owner. 
Therefore, the creator of messages can be easily verified using certificate verification function. 
  
The attribute Alive is another claim which is used to verify the aliveness of the system. This 
property shows that the messages exchanged between authentication parties are consistent 
and not tampered by the adversary to include its own challenge e.g. communication between 
service developers and smartizen through APIs. In our used protocol, challenge numbers are 
digitally signed which holds the properties of tamper resistance and source authentication.  
  
The attribute Niagree ensures that the sender and receiver both are agreed to exchange the 
messages safely and according to the predefined sequence e.g. data management between 
Pesh council and Zebr cloud. 
  
We also analysed through Scyther that our protocol satisfied the Commit attribute which shows 
that the designed protocol confirms the correct response received from authenticating party on 
corresponding running event e.g. login activity by business organizations to access Smartizen. 
  
The verified results of above mentioned properties are shown in Figure 7. The results shows 
that the used authentication protocol satisfied all properties and resist against man-in-the-
middle, replay attack, and message tampering. This authentication protocol does not preserve 
privacy of the user so during authentication an attacker can extract the identity of the users. For 
this it is recommended that instead of using identity based certificate, an anonymous certificate 
may be used but the sequence and procedure of the protocol remains same.   
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 Figure 7: Scyther based verification results for authentication protocol  
 
  
5.2. Lightweight Secure Communication Protocol 
A smart city service client machine may have different capabilities for example a user can use 
their mobile device for fetching healthcare related information or any other service through 
Smartizen app. Another user may use his laptop to fetch tax related information. So based on 
their capabilities we defined two different secure communication protocols. If a device has 
limited resources then a user may use username and password for initial authentication and 
then exchanges secure session key to send encrypted messages. If a user has already 
credentials then he/she may use Strong Authentication for authentication and then use 
asymmetric key cryptography to share session key. Figure 8 illustrates secure communication 
protocol verification model that uses three roles service provider and two sensors (or service 
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consumers i.e. devices or users). The complete protocol is further modelled in Scyther for model 
verification: 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Secure Communication Protocol Verification Model  
 
/*   * Secure Communication Protocol (SCP)  */ // The protocol description   
usertype RandomNumber; 
usertype SessionKey; 
usertype UserName; 
usertype  Password; 
hashfunction H; usertype Message; 
protocol SCP1(Sensor1,ServiceProvider,Sensor2) 
{ 
 role Sensor1 
 { 
      fresh Rs: RandomNumber; 
     fresh Rp: RandomNumber; 
   fresh msg: Message; 
     fresh Sk: SessionKey; 
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     var Usr: UserName; 
             var Pwd: Password;    
     var Hello: Message; 
   
          send_1(Sensor1,ServiceProvider,Hello); 
         recv_2(ServiceProvider,Sensor1, Rp ); 
   send_3(Sensor1,ServiceProvider, Usr,Rs,{{Rs, Rp} H } Pwd );   
         recv_4(ServiceProvider,Sensor1,{Sk}Pwd); 
         send_5(Sensor1,Sensor2, {msg,{msg}H}Sk);          
       
claim(Sensor1,Secret,Sk);       
   claim(Sensor1,Secret,Rp);       
   claim(Sensor1,Alive);           
   claim(Sensor1,Weakagree);       
   claim(Sensor1,Commit,ServiceProvider,Sensor2); 
   claim(Sensor1,Niagree); 
    claim(Sensor1,Nisynch); 
     }  
  
 role ServiceProvider 
 { 
    fresh Rs: RandomNumber;       
    fresh Rp: RandomNumber;     
   fresh msg: Message;   
   fresh Sk: SessionKey;       
   var Usr: UserName;    
   var Pwd: Password;    
   var Hello: Message;        
   recv_1(Sensor1,ServiceProvider,Hello); 
  
   send_2(ServiceProvider,Sensor1, Rp );   
   recv_3(Sensor1,ServiceProvider, Usr,Rs,{{Rs, Rp} H } Pwd );     
   send_4(ServiceProvider,Sensor1,{Sk}Pwd); 
    
    claim (ServiceProvider, Secret, Hello);       
   claim (ServiceProvider,Secret, Rs);           
    claim (ServiceProvider,Secret, Rp);           
    claim(ServiceProvider,Niagree);         
   claim(ServiceProvider,Nisynch);  
 } 
  
 role Sensor2 
 { 
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   fresh msg: Message;   
   fresh Sk: SessionKey;       
   recv_5(Sensor1,Sensor2, {msg,{msg}H}Sk);            
 
   claim(Sensor2,Secret,msg);        
    claim(Sensor2,Weakagree);        
   claim(Sensor2,Niagree);           
   claim(Sensor2,Nisynch); 
 }  
} 
 
The verification result of above specified secure communication protocol is shown in Figure 9. 
This figure shows that our secure communication protocol ensure the privacy of Session Key 
(Sk), Service Provider and Sensor (or device) Challenges that is Rp and Rs respectively, during 
the execution of the protocol. Furthermore, the aliveness claim of the protocol describes that the 
communicating entities response could not be tampered which is considered the basic property 
of a good authentication protocol. The Commit claim shows that both Sensor and Service 
Provider are receiving correct responses during the execution. The other property of 
authentication protocol which protects the system from replay attack as shown in the 
Synchronization claim while the Secret property shows that the message is secure between 
sensor and service provider. If a user has digital certificates then he/she uses RSA keys to 
share the session key and then uses the above process to exchange secure messages. 
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Figure 9: Scyther based verification results for secure communication protocol  
 
 
5.3. Protection of Services & Applications 
In the SSServProv framework (figure 4), the trusted platform/module (in the services and 
application component of the smart cities inhabitants/infrastructure layer) keeps a copy of 
hashed libraries in local storage which is only accessible to the authenticated users. If the owner 
of services and applications is interested to ensure the integrity of their libraries then he/she 
sends a request to the verifier module which generates the digital signature of all libraries and 
classes of used services and applications. After that it sends this digital signature to the trusted 
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module which extracts the hash value and if the hash value is not same then it sends a request 
to the verifier to generate an alarm for possible tampering in the services and applications 
modules. In the above scenario, they use digital signature technique which is already verified 
against well-known attacks in above verification steps.   
 
5.4. Enforcing XACML based Access Control policies 
Role based access control, RBAC [29], can be directly mapped on the roles identified in the 
onion model (Figure 1). In this regard, we implemented such roles and associated policies in 
XACML which are used by the PDP for access control decisions and enforced by the PEP. In 
this paper, we present simple examples of the definition of roles, associated access control 
policy sets and their enforcement using access tokens acquired during our authentication 
process (as shown in Figure 6) to show Permissions and Roles policy sets for different actions 
and resources. In the following examples, the service provider role is authorised to send 
requested report whereas service consumer role is authorised to request a resource (or report).  
 
Role policy set for service provider - An Example 
<!-- Role <PolicySet> for Service Provider role --> 
<PolicySet PolicySetId="RPS:serviceprovider:role"> 
 <Target> 
  <Subjects> 
    <Subject> 
     <SubjectMatch MatchId="&function;anyURI-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;anyURI"> &roles;serviceprovider  
                                                                        </AttributeValue> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&role;" DataType=  
                                                                       "&xml;anyURI"/> 
     </SubjectMatch> 
    </Subject> 
  </Subjects> 
 </Target> 
 
 <!-- Use permissions associated with the service provider role --> 
 <PolicySetIdReference>PPS:serviceprovider:role</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet> 
 
Role policy set for service consumer - An Example 
<!-- Role <PolicySet> for Service Consumer role --> 
<PolicySet PolicySetId="RPS:serviceconsumer:role"> 
 <Target> 
  <Subjects> 
    <Subject> 
     <SubjectMatch MatchId="&function;anyURI-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue DataType="&xml;anyURI">&roles;serviceconsumer  
                                                                        </AttributeValue> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&role;" DataType= 
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                                                                       "&xml;anyURI"/> 
     </SubjectMatch> 
    </Subject> 
  </Subjects> 
 </Target> 
 
 <!-- Use permissions associated with the service consumer role --> 
 <PolicySetIdReference>PPS:serviceconsumer:role</PolicySetIdReference> 
</PolicySet> 
 
Another working example is provided in Annex-B, where service provider-consumer permission 
policy set is used by the Pesh City Council to define access rights of consumer and services 
providers e.g., to send/open various activities of citizens like calories-count for their exercise 
routines. 
 
6. Related Work and Discussion  
Smart city solutions where citizens also play a major role in data collection are implicitly 
expected to be secure and preserve users’ privacy and establish trust on technological 
innovations in an urban living environment. Most of the related work presented in this section 
indicates that other researchers has dealt with various aspects of security, privacy and trust 
individually but a holistic approach to deal with smart cities based data security, privacy and 
trust issues is missing. We present related work with the objective to assess the effectiveness of 
our proposed framework as summarised in Table 1 (Annex-A).  
 
Vermesan, O., Friess, P., [17, p92-95, p207-241] highlights trust, privacy and security issues 
related to IoTs in smart city context and present various solutions provided by different previous 
and on-going projects e.g. iCore Access Framework, IoT@Work CapBAC, GAMBAS Adaptive 
middleware, IoT-A, SMARTIE, etc which provide useful insights about IoT related security and 
privacy issues in smart cities. Some of these are presented in this section.  
 
In [18], Sen M et al. highlight security and privacy concerns which may arise due to smart 
software applications in a city environment. They highlight sensor tracking, hacking, data source 
authentication and exchange of data between devices over unsecured network as potential 
security issues that may lead to smart city software security and privacy aspects. Authors 
conclude that smart software should only be used if software operations and network 
communication is secured. However, three component based security model presented by 
authors is too obscure to cover all identified security and privacy issues in smart cities ICT 
infrastructure and applications.  
 
In [19], Wang L et al highlight data security, authorisation and privacy issues that can arise in an 
integrated city management platform which uses various ICT technologies such as Internet of 
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Things (IoT), cloud etc. In particular they highlight cloud security issues including service 
availability, authorisation, access, audit, monitoring, secure transmission, viruses and risks from 
other users of the cloud system. Their proposed security strategy attempts to deal with the 
abovementioned security threats by applying various information security techniques such as 
encryption, authentication access. However, authors’ proposed security model for management 
system of a smart city does not clearly indicate how necessary information about security 
measures can be applied at different levels of governance by acquiring and sharing cross-
departmental data for necessary information processing and decision making in a city 
environment.  
 
Suciu G mainly proposes a open sensor cloud platform to facilitate use of IoT for smart city 
applications [20]. Suciu argues for cloud and IoT paradigms integration and emphasize on 
privacy management in cloud environment. However, the proposed framework do not explicitly 
cover security and privacy aspects.  
 
Bartoli et al highlighted the importance of handling security and privacy challenges of smart 
cities right from the beginning [21]. The authors discussed key challenges, emerging 
technologies and issues to watch. In their work the authors advised that by introducing strict 
security standards on new technologies most of the security and privacy issues can be 
resolved. They also suggested that private and confidential information must be decoupled from 
its owner in order to avoid any privacy infringement; thus, in case of a successful attack 
compromised data can be trace backed to its owner – consequently ensuring user’s privacy. 
The authors presented security and privacy issues in Smart grid environment. They identified 
privacy as the most critical issue that must be addressed. They emphasized on the importance 
of configurable privacy settings – putting users in control of their data according to their 
preferences. Network connectivity is also considered as an issue having serious consequences 
on users’ privacy. The authors pointed out that private communication can provide protection 
against most attacks; however, it is not feasible since isolated systems cannot offer 
personalized services to the inhabitants of a smart city. It is also presented that smart city 
prophecies the concept of system-of-systems; however, it significantly increases the number of 
vulnerabilities in a final system then each of the participating sub-system. The authors also 
highlighted that availability of services is a key challenges as adversary can prevent authorised 
users from consuming services by launching denial-of-service attacks. The authors also 
suggested that scalability of key management solutions is very important as in Smart city 
millions of sensing devices would be spread across hundreds of organizations. A key 
management solution that can keep track of skewed keys and issue legitimate access key 
would play a critical role in securing private and confidential information. 
 
Martínez-Ballesté at el suggested that ability of a Smart city to gather unprecedented amount of 
data and massively deployed sensing devices connected through heterogeneous networks are 
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main causes of citizen privacy [22]. The authors claim that privacy is a fundamental right of a 
citizen, the success of smart cities is directly associated with it. In their work the authors 
highlighted that existing privacy preserving methodologies can be employed to ensure citizen 
privacy. Techniques like statistical disclosure can be employed to allow release of data for 
secondary use.  Similarly, private information retrieval methodologies can be used to access 
data without revealing data access pattern to data custodian and privacy-preserving data mining 
can leverage collaborative service providers to learn interesting pattern from each other’s data 
without compromising privacy of the involved entities. Location privacy and pseudonym can be 
employed to ensure service provider cannot relate private and confidential data with the data 
owner (i.e., data owner). Privacy in RFID and video surveillance can be utilized to realize Smart 
city ecosystem in which sensing devices and actuators cannot be exploited to compromise 
privacy of its inhabitants. Based on existing models of database privacy [23] and location based 
service privacy [24], the authors proposed 5D model for privacy in smart cities – encompassing 
five dimensions of identity, query, location, footprint and owner privacy.  The authors highlighted 
the fact that the existing technologies can be leveraged to ensure privacy in all of those 
fundamental dimensions. For instance, users’ identities can be protected if geographically 
separated pseudonymizers are used. Similarly, user queries can be secured by the use of 
private information retrieval. Location and footprint privacy can be ensured by masking user’s 
location and statistical disclosure of information respectively. Owner privacy can be achieved by 
the means of privacy-preserving data mining and even by the use of statistical disclosure of 
information. 
 
Smart cities are driven by the advancements in information and communication technologies. 
Elmaghraby, A. and Losavio, M., highlighted the fact that these advancements put security of 
citizens at risk and most importantly challenges the privacy expectations of Smart city’s 
inhabitants [25]. The authors pointed out that with massively connected environments the 
societies are embracing full-connectivity namely “Internet-of-things”. There are unprecedented 
opportunities to improve quality of life, city infrastructure, intelligent transport system to name a 
few. However, the authors argue that hidden in this full-connectivity, citizens are inadvertently 
sharing data about their location and activity; in such a case, privacy seems to be disappearing. 
To ensure citizen privacy the authors presented an interaction model involving smart cities 
entities namely: persons, servers and things. The interaction model is described as a graph 
whose vertices are involved entities. The authors emphasised on the fact the stronger privacy 
and security mechanisms are needed to protect edges interconnecting vertices. In their work the 
authors identified that in Smart cities not only private and confidential data is at risk, security of 
its inhabitants faces escalating challenges. This is because malicious service providers can 
collude to exploit available information inadvertently shared by the inhabitants. 
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SMARTIE project10 has ambitious objectives and aims to provide a distributed framework for 
sharing large scale smart city heterogeneous data from multiple sources by ensuring security, 
privacy and trust in information to promote reusability across multiple applications. SMARTIE 
provides a layered architecture (applications, information services, network, smart objects) for 
smart cities applications (transport, energy, public safety, utilities etc) and different security, 
privacy and trust related requirements are identified.  SMARTIE project aim to build on existing 
solutions from UbiSec&Sense, SENSEI etc. They identify various techniques for trust (e.g. 
transitive trust, FAIR - fuzzy-based aggregation providing in-network resilience, two-step 
aggregate-and-confirm approach), privacy (authorisation and authentication mechanisms 
including policy language, minimal disclosure technique), security (e.g. SPINS protocols for 
confidential communication and authenticated broadcast in wireless sensor networks, 
lightweight cryptography techniques due to resource constraints of IoT e.g. asymmetric 
cryptography etc).  
 
 Internet of Things Architecture (IoT-A)11 project proposes a dynamic and flexible architecture 
allowing determining new IoT resources at runtime and hence needs necessary level of security 
measures. IoT-A aims to adapt different solutions from wireless sensor networks to flexibly 
support multiple possible IoT scenarios. The project introduces a secure and trustworthy 
resolution infrastructure to support resolution of names & identities to addresses and locators 
used by the services in an IoT environment. Gruschka, N. and Gessner, D. Eds [26] have 
defined number of security requirements for system dependability, communication structure and 
user & service privacy. At the core of IoT-A security functionalities, there are five logical security 
components: Authorisation, Authentication, Identity Management, Key Exchange and 
Management, and Trust & Reputation. For example, the authorisation component is used to 
perform access control decisions based on access control policies and models (e.g. role based 
access control model or attribute based access control model) implemented in eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) - a policy decision language based on XML and 
standardised by OASIS. Also, it defines a Policy Administration Point interface that allows any 
new service to register with resolution infrastructure. Like any typical security model 
Authentication is also one of the necessary component of IoT-A resolution infrastructure 
implemented in Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). For Identity management, IoT-A 
issues Pseudonyms and accessory information to trusted subjects so that they can operate 
anonymously. IoT-A’s Key Exchange and Management component ensures secure 
communication between two or more IoT-A peers including users and service e.g. by setting up 
tunnel between gateways. IoT-A’s adopts a generic trust and reputation architecture which 
consists of five steps: gathering information, scoring & ranking entities, entity selection, 
transaction and rewarding & punishing entities.  
                                               
10 SMARTIE: http://www.smartie-project.eu/   
11 IoT-A: http://www.iot-a.eu/public  
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IoT@Work12 project aims at developing IoT-based plug and play concept on industrial 
automation. Due to potentially unbounded number of IoT (resources and objects) and more fine-
grained control requirements over service orchestration, Access Control List based 
authorisation frameworks are not scalable. This project envisions Capability based Authorisation 
framework for IoT, having support for capability delegation, revocation and information 
granularity. Unlike conventional authorisation frameworks Capability based Authorisation can 
adopt to collaborative environment enabling data / service owners to define multiple level of 
capabilities handling access requests from different users. IoT@Work defines functional 
element of capability based authorisation as: resources, authorisation capability, capability 
renovation, operation request, resource Policy Decision Point, resource manager and 
revocation service. For privacy consideration within untrusted network / collaboration IoT@Work 
supports Encrypted Capability Chain and Anonymous Capabilities. 
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper presents a detailed security and privacy concerns for smart city stakeholders – 
service providers, service consumers (citizens) and governing bodies. The security and privacy 
threats we are explicitly presented from each stakeholder’s point of view; careful analysis of 
these treats fed in the proposed service provision framework for smart city. The stakeholder 
onion model identifies different stakeholders’ roles and actors which help in deriving different 
components of the ‘Smart Secure Service Provisioning’ (SSServProv) Framework. The 
SSServProv framework focuses on end-to-end security and privacy covering the entire service 
provision model of smart cities. The framework is designed to ensure only legitimate service 
providers can provision their services; whilst ensuring citizen private and sensitive data is never 
compromised. Similarly, the framework also protects services from being compromised by 
malicious citizen – ensuring service providers are making use of accurate citizen data to curate 
services. 
 
The layered architecture of the SSServProv framework is flexible and hence can be scaled to 
handle various smart city security scenarios. The efficacy of the proposed framework is tested in 
Scyther verification tool for authentication, light weight secure communication protocol and 
protection of services and applications using trusted module against different security attacks. 
Also, XACML based role and permission sets are defined and used with SAML for resource 
authorisation. These automated verification results are promising as they indicate successful 
service provisioning in the presence of selected security threats. Whilst these tests results of 
individual components prove usefulness of the framework to a certain extent, more testing and 
verification of all integrated components of SSServProv framework will provide more sound 
basis for adoption and development in a smart city infrastructure. For the future research work, 
                                               
12 IoT@Work: https://www.iot-at-work.eu/  
38 
 
the authors will extend this framework to configurable security and privacy services. The focus 
will be on services that can comply with evolving government regulations considering new 
technological advancements and escalating cyber security threats.  
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Annex – A: Table 1: Range of features in SServProv Framework 
 
confide
ntiality 
encry
ption 
authent
ication 
availa
bility 
access 
control 
author
isation 
securit
y  privacy trust others 
SSServProv Framework  x x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Stakeholder specific, and end-to-
end security and privacy. 
Sen M et al., (2013) [18]                   
Device vulnerability detection, 
Antivirus, Spam filter, and Firewall. 
Wang L et al., (2012) [19]   x x   
x 
(key-
based)         
Electromagnetic shielding, Key-
based audit, and Antivirus 
Suciu G (2013) [20]               x     
Bartoli et al., (2011) [21]       x       
x 
(decoupling 
private 
information 
from owner)   Key management 
Martínez-Ballesté at el., (2013) 
[22] x             x     
Elmaghraby, A. and Losavio, 
M., (2014) [25]               x     
SMARTIE Project   x x     x x x x   
IoT-A Project     x     x x   x Identity and key management 
IoT@Work Project         x x   x     
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Annex-B: Permission policy set for service provider and consumer- An Example 
 
<Policy PolicyId="serviceconsumer-provider" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:first-applicable"> 
  <Description>Service consumer-provider policy is used by the Pesh (City council) to define access rigths of 
consumer and services provides to send/open various activities of citizens like calories-count and their exercise 
routines</Description> 
 
  <Target> 
    <Subjects> 
      <Subject> 
        <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">serviceprovider</AttributeValue> 
          <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"  
                  DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </SubjectMatch> 
      </Subject> 
    </Subjects> 
    <Resources> 
      <Resource> 
        <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">calories-count</AttributeValue> 
          <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"  
                   DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </ResourceMatch> 
      </Resource> 
    </Resources> 
    <Actions> 
      <Action> 
        <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Send</AttributeValue> 
          <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
                    DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </ActionMatch> 
      </Action> 
    </Actions> 
  </Target> 
 
  <Rule RuleId="Rule1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>permit basic rule</Description> 
    <Target> 
      <Subjects> 
        <Subject> 
          <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">serviceprovider</AttributeValue> 
            <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"  
                      DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </SubjectMatch> 
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        </Subject> 
      </Subjects> 
      <Resources> 
        <Resource> 
          <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">exercise-routines</AttributeValue> 
            <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"  
                        DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ResourceMatch> 
        </Resource> 
      </Resources> 
      <Actions> 
        <Action> 
          <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">send</AttributeValue> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
                         DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ActionMatch> 
        </Action> 
      </Actions> 
    </Target> 
  </Rule> 
 
 
  <Target> 
      <Subjects> 
        <Subject> 
          <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">serviceconsumer</AttributeValue> 
            <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"  
                         DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </SubjectMatch> 
        </Subject> 
      </Subjects> 
      <Resources> 
        <Resource> 
          <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">exercise-routines</AttributeValue> 
            <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"  
                          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ResourceMatch> 
        </Resource> 
      </Resources> 
      <Actions> 
        <Action> 
          <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Open</AttributeValue> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
                          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
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          </ActionMatch> 
        </Action> 
      </Actions> 
    </Target> 
  </Rule> 
 
  <Rule RuleId="Rule2" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>permit basic rule</Description> 
    <Target> 
      <Subjects> 
        <Subject> 
          <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">serviceconsumer</AttributeValue> 
            <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"  
                          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </SubjectMatch> 
        </Subject> 
      </Subjects> 
      <Resources> 
        <Resource> 
          <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">exercise-routines</AttributeValue> 
            <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"  
                          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ResourceMatch> 
        </Resource> 
      </Resources> 
      <Actions> 
        <Action> 
          <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Open</AttributeValue> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
                       DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ActionMatch> 
        </Action> 
      </Actions> 
    </Target> 
  </Rule> 
</Policy> 
 
In the above framework, we are following XACML based enriched authorisation solution, 
therefore Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Authorisation request and service 
response are also following the same rules. The SAMLAuthorisation request is simple but 
services response is cryptographically protected. It uses XML based security standard to protect 
SAMLAuthorisationResponse as show in the following examples.  
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SAML Authorisation request: 
<Request> 
  <Subject SubjectCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"   DataType=       
                   "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
          <AttributeValue>serviceconsumer</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Subject> 
  <Resource> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType=  
                  "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
          <AttributeValue>exercise-routines</AttributeValue></Attribute> 
  </Resource> 
  <Action> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" DataType=  
                 "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
          <AttributeValue>Open</AttributeValue></Attribute> 
  </Action> 
</Request> 
 
SAML Authorisation Response: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Response xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol" xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc;SAML:1.0:protocol" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www/w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/SMLSchema-instance" 
IssueInstant="2016-07-23T21:01:35.921Z" MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1" Recipient="PEP" 
ResponseID="lM1lSMNAUrnx"> 
  <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <ds:SignedInfo> 
      <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
      <ds:SignatureMethod SignatureMethod="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
      <ds:Reference URI="#lM1lSMNAUrnx"> 
        <ds:Transforms> 
          <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
          <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n" /> 
        </ds:Transforms> 
        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal1" /> 
        <ds:DigestValue>JV8eYPnHeh1A4ViSXoFMrkEQcDLx</ds:DigestValue> 
      </ds:Reference> 
    </ds:SignedInfo> 
    
<ds:SignatureValue>nv0ZMjR1w/9grdi4l2lIb0CWYMh/5y42LRbJmyNQx8pTEEWrRO6bv69kbkx+/EHeG+mkWE6OK
mIf0GkJGPsLabT/WUH2B54OaV3ZwtOI6G9r4HA50emrjcHWjQfSX2/Bp6Ot45SkO2Jb0A2FNMDdgOa1yZ53UrXSTe
lPajoU8EPx</ds:SignatureValue> 
    <ds:KeyInfo> 
      <ds:X509Data> 
        
<ds:X509Certificate>MIIE8zCCBFygAwIBAgIBFTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBqTEMMAoGA1UEBhMDVVNBMQs
wCQYDVQQIEwJNRDEXMBUGA1UEBxMOTm9ydGggQmV0aGVzZGExJTAjBgNVBAoTHFNFVEVDUyBTZWN1cm
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l0eSBUZWNobm9sb2dpZXMxHDAaBgNVBAsTE1NFVEVDUyBTZWN1cml0eSBVU0ExEzARBgNVBAMTCkxDQSB
TZXJ2ZXIxGTAXBglghkgBhvhCAQITCjEwLjAuMS4yNDAwHhcNMTIwMTIwMTcxOTA0WhcNMTMwMTE5MTcxOTA
0WjBlMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEOMAwGA1UECBMFU29sbmExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN0b2NraG9sbTEPMA0GA1U
EChMGU0VURUNTMQwwCgYDVQQLFgNSJkQxEzARBgNVBAMTClBEUCBTZXJ2ZXIwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQE
BBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL2iY+Wy87ysRw/G1WVJNXgil52DKxO4he6VRL4XmV2AlacwS7vL2pPm/5C7KkOJwNzj7
MflXemQQz3f7XHwXKOtHOcdBr6eDsGXvM/0UdHpy8GeXFXOg6HQ1Ql4lVKt4RGpIr2UZAqBzfUsadLStG7E3xsRy
9iLh2Iv8V44vaqBAgMBAAGjggJsMIICaDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBsAwDwYDVR0TAQEABAUwAwIB/zATBglghkg
BZQMGCQEBAQAEAwEBATBABgNVHREBAQAENjA0gTJMb2NhbCBDQSBTZXJ2ZXIsTmV0d29ya2luZyBEaXZpc
2lvbixTRVRFQ1MgSW5jLixVUzCBwwYDVR0jAQEABIG4MIG1oYGvpIGsMIGpMQwwCgYDVQQGEwNVU0ExCzAJ
BgNVBAgTAk1EMRcwFQYDVQQHEw5Ob3J0aCBCZXRoZXNkYTElMCMGA1UEChMcU0VURUNTIFNlY3VyaXR5I
FRlY2hub2xvZ2llczEcMBoGA1UECxMTU0VURUNTIFNlY3VyaXR5IFVTQTETMBEGA1UEAxMKSENBIFNlcnZlcjEZ
MBcGCWCGSAGG+EIBAhMKMTAuMC4xLjI0MIIBATCBkQYDVR0gAQEABIGGMIGDMD8GCWCGSAFlAwEwATAy
MDAGCCsGAQUFBwIBFiRodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNldGVjcy5jb20vQ2VydFBvbGljeS5odG0wQAYKYIZIAWUCAQwBAT
AyMDAGCCsGAQUFBwIBFiRodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNldGVjcy5jb20vQ2VydFBvbGljeS5odG0wQAYDVR0SAQEABDYw
NIEyTG9jYWwgQ0EgU2VydmVyLE5ldHdvcmtpbmcgRGl2aXNpb24sU0VURUNTIEluYy4sVVMwPQYDVR0fAQEAB
DMwMTAvoi2kKzApMScwJQYJYIZIAYb4QgECExhsZGFwOi8vMTI4LjE2NC44Mi41MjozODkwEwYJYIZIAWUDBgkB
AQEABAMBAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAwInX8ATR22UqCN7qUV+Bhjx58BguA1RMuNhe1dKJcg4BXibf
TWPLpV/+h4cuFyo+0CD+CnW7EAOl0JggFZ0vrcigLNALiCwFpSIpKG+ECaOcwCKivGeRF69eMM9DTxyb2hIgwTs6
9/B0b+4XjG/wPP2vh15jcGq2qoWnB2nX3VDx|$|1|$|1271</ds:X509Certificate> 
      </ds:X509Data> 
    </ds:KeyInfo> 
  </ds:Signature> 
  <Status xmlns=""> 
    <StatusCode Value="samlp:Success" /> 
  </Status> 
  <Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" AssertionID="yc6yjOr7nVTx" Issuer="192.168.1.10" 
IssueInstant="2016-07-23T21:01:36.015Z" MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1"> 
    <Conditions xmlns="" NotBefore="2016-07-23T21:01:36.031Z" NotOnOrAfter="2016-07-23T21:06:36.031Z"> 
      <AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
        <Audience>Pesh-council</Audience> 
      </AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
    </Conditions> 
    <AuthenticationStatement xmlns="" AuthenticationInstant="2080-01-04T18:08:47.109Z" AuthenticationMethod=" 
                     urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:X509-PKI"> 
      <Subject> 
        <NameIdentifier Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified">  
                    GaJurYm3cNvx</NameIdentifier> 
        <SubjectConfirmation> 
          <SubjectConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</SubjectConfirmationMethod> 
        </SubjectConfirmation> 
      </Subject> 
      <SubjectLocality IPAddress="" /> 
    </AuthenticationStatement> 
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
      <ds:SignedInfo> 
        <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
        <ds:SignatureMethod SignatureMethod="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
        <ds:Reference URI="#yc6yjOr7nVTx"> 
          <ds:Transforms> 
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            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n" /> 
          </ds:Transforms> 
          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal1" /> 
          <ds:DigestValue>k/siAyoR3q7TPfbQk8jeB2+Yzdbx</ds:DigestValue> 
        </ds:Reference> 
      </ds:SignedInfo> 
      
<ds:SignatureValue>P4KfPxYuQ23C8a43l/loGO+g4u7cVHMaYxBtSSElVklAQcKOihb9JbRTE422IbvQDfX2dG7T+/B
AR8m8Xn4fYyM9+dSzp34351UoXKgGoFQUjUOiIybXh+Wm1h28172l2al4pA0rs8uz+vrVMj2f6vV9iIK+iRm+rKdsZ2oj
nnzx</ds:SignatureValue> 
      <ds:KeyInfo> 
        <ds:X509Data> 
          
<ds:X509Certificate>MIIE8zCCBFygAwIBAgIBFTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBqTEMMAoGA1UEBhMDVVNBMQs
wCQYDVQQIEwJNRDEXMBUGA1UEBxMOTm9ydGggQmV0aGVzZGExJTAjBgNVBAoTHFNFVEVDUyBTZWN1cm
l0eSBUZWNobm9sb2dpZXMxHDAaBgNVBAsTE1NFVEVDUyBTZWN1cml0eSBVU0ExEzARBgNVBAMTCkxDQSB
TZXJ2ZXIxGTAXBglghkgBhvhCAQITCjEwLjAuMS4yNDAwHhcNMTIwMTIwMTcxOTA0WhcNMTMwMTE5MTcxOTA
0WjBlMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEOMAwGA1UECBMFU29sbmExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN0b2NraG9sbTEPMA0GA1U
EChMGU0VURUNTMQwwCgYDVQQLFgNSJkQxEzARBgNVBAMTClBEUCBTZXJ2ZXIwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQE
BBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL2iY+Wy87ysRw/G1WVJNXgil52DKxO4he6VRL4XmV2AlacwS7vL2pPm/5C7KkOJwNzj7
MflXemQQz3f7XHwXKOtHOcdBr6eDsGXvM/0UdHpy8GeXFXOg6HQ1Ql4lVKt4RGpIr2UZAqBzfUsadLStG7E3xsRy
9iLh2Iv8V44vaqBAgMBAAGjggJsMIICaDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBsAwDwYDVR0TAQEABAUwAwIB/zATBglghkg
BZQMGCQEBAQAEAwEBATBABgNVHREBAQAENjA0gTJMb2NhbCBDQSBTZXJ2ZXIsTmV0d29ya2luZyBEaXZpc
2lvbixTRVRFQ1MgSW5jLixVUzCBwwYDVR0jAQEABIG4MIG1oYGvpIGsMIGpMQwwCgYDVQQGEwNVU0ExCzAJ
BgNVBAgTAk1EMRcwFQYDVQQHEw5Ob3J0aCBCZXRoZXNkYTElMCMGA1UEChMcU0VURUNTIFNlY3VyaXR5I
FRlY2hub2xvZ2llczEcMBoGA1UECxMTU0VURUNTIFNlY3VyaXR5IFVTQTETMBEGA1UEAxMKSENBIFNlcnZlcjEZ
MBcGCWCGSAGG+EIBAhMKMTAuMC4xLjI0MIIBATCBkQYDVR0gAQEABIGGMIGDMD8GCWCGSAFlAwEwATAy
MDAGCCsGAQUFBwIBFiRodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNldGVjcy5jb20vQ2VydFBvbGljeS5odG0wQAYKYIZIAWUCAQwBAT
AyMDAGCCsGAQUFBwIBFiRodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNldGVjcy5jb20vQ2VydFBvbGljeS5odG0wQAYDVR0SAQEABDYw
NIEyTG9jYWwgQ0EgU2VydmVyLE5ldHdvcmtpbmcgRGl2aXNpb24sU0VURUNTIEluYy4sVVMwPQYDVR0fAQEAB
DMwMTAvoi2kKzApMScwJQYJYIZIAYb4QgECExhsZGFwOi8vMTI4LjE2NC44Mi41MjozODkwEwYJYIZIAWUDBgkB
AQEABAMBAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAwInX8ATR22UqCN7qUV+Bhjx58BguA1RMuNhe1dKJcg4BXibf
TWPLpV/+h4cuFyo+0CD+CnW7EAOl0JggFZ0vrcigLNALiCwFpSIpKG+ECaOcwCKivGeRF69eMM9DTxyb2hIgwTs6
9/B0b+4XjG/wPP2vh15jcGq2qoWnB2nX3VDx|$|1|$|1271</ds:X509Certificate> 
        </ds:X509Data> 
      </ds:KeyInfo> 
    </ds:Signature> 
  </Assertion> 
</Response>  
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